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ABSTRACT PAGE

D eloache, Uttal, and R osengren (2004) reported that 18-to- 30-month-old children
som etim es failed to u se information about an object’s size and tried to perform impossible
actions on miniature objects. The rese a rc h e rs believed this w as a perception-action
dissociation in the behavioral re sp o n se s of normally developing young children and
interpreted th e se sc ale errors a s problem s with inhibitory control and the integration of
visual information for perception and action. In our current study we investigate the
similarities betw een sc ale errors and other developm ental errors to find which
characteristics about th e s e ta sk s c a u se children to m ake an inappropriate or inaccurate
action resp o n ses. W e attem pt to determ ine which object characteristics increase or
d e c re a se the occurrence of scale errors and believe that children of all a g e s (and possibly
adults) can comm it th e se sc ale errors given a specific cue or situation.
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Investigating Scale Errors: Independent Systems of Object Representation or Simple
Motor Priming?
People of all ages make use of visual information to guide their behaviors or
responses while interacting with their environments. They are usually accurate in their
judgments but when faced with certain situations, they sometimes make very salient
errors in their responses. In these instances adults and children seem to be cognitively
aware of things but fail to act appropriately on the basis o f their knowledge. Researchers
have labeled these unique situations as “dissociations” or “errors” and some researchers
have even suggested there is a dissociation between the knowledge and action systems
that is both neural and psychological. Many believe that this dissociation occurs when the
action system is impaired or not fully developed whereas the knowledge system is fully
functioning (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Diamond, 1991). Examining these errors from a
developmental perspective can lead to a better understanding of motor, perceptual, and
cognitive processes interact and how the environment influences these processes.
A-not-B-Error
A classic developmental error first described by Piaget (1954) is the A-not-B
error. It has been demonstrated that before 7 or 8 months of age, infants seem to refuse to
search for a toy that has been hidden under a cover. Early researchers described this
phenomenon as if the toy stopped existing in the minds of the infants. After 12 months of
age infants will continue to search for the toy, even if the toy is hidden in several
different places. The A-not-B error occurs during 7-12 months when infants will search at
one location and will continue to search at the first location even when they visibly see
the experimenter hide the toy in an adjacent location underneath an identical cloth. This
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error is very robust when assessed in this manner, but as soon as even small variations
take place, the error can be disrupted and the infant will search correctly at the second
location to obtain the toy. For instance, making the hiding covers more distinct in color
from one another can lead to an increase in accurate reaching (Wellman, Cross, &
Bartsch, 1986).
In his original observations of the A-not-B search task, Piaget (1954) reported that
infants would occasionally look to the correct location while reaching perseveratively at
the incorrect location. Perseveration is the repetition of previously performed but now
inappropriate act and has been attributed to strong motor memories. The more times an
infant reaches to a particular location, the stronger the motor memory and frequency of
that perseverative behavior (Diedrich, Thelen, Smith, & Corbetta, 2000).
Neural network models have demonstrated that perseveration could arise from
Hebbian learning mechanisms because the neural network will tend to strengthen
whatever response is made to a stimulus (Munakata, 1998). Perhaps this simple neuronal
tendency could provide an account for why these inappropriate action responses occur
and perseverative behaviors could result from the formation of a tightly bound ensemble
of neuronal activity created by highly similar and repeated responses (Diedrich, Thelen,
Smith, & Corbetta, 2000).
Edelman (1987) found that neural ensembles that are simultaneously and
repeatedly activated together become stronger and more likely to become activated again.
This is derived from the concept of Hebbian learning which states that a neuron’s
contribution to the firing of another neuron could increase if that cell is repeatedly
involved in the activation of the second (Hebb, 1949). This concept may be particularly
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relevant for certain kinds of statistical learning that appear to occur without any overt task
or directed effort to learn. This automatic or self-organizing nature of Hebbian learning
could simply happen in response to a selection of inputs from the environment, without
any consideration of what outputs or behaviors should be produced in response to those
inputs (Munakata & Pfaffly, 2004).
There have been many studies using visual violation-of-expectancy measures to
show that although infants will consistently make the A-not-B error when reaching for
hidden objects, they do seem to expect that the objects will be found in the correct
location when no action response is required (Baillargeon & Graber, 1988). In these
studies looking time measures were employed and when the infant does not have to
produce an action response and is only required to produce a looking response, infants
seem to know the correct location of the hidden object. Longer looking times indicate a
violation of expectancy and infants will look longer when the hidden object is not
retrieved from the correct location. There have been many different explanations for this
apparent dissociation. Some researchers believe that reaching involves a stronger object
representation than looking (Munakata et al. 1997), while others believe it is the case that
the “knowing” system is unable to control the “acting” system (Bertenthal, 1996).
Some researchers believe that these dissociations are failures of the child’s
executive function system and could be attributed to an inability to inhibit inappropriate
responding (Diamond, 2002; Zelazo & Frye, 1998). Executive function refers to
processes responsible for higher-level action control (including inhibition, planning,
coordination and the control of action sequences) that are necessary for maintaining a
specified goal and avoiding distractions (Duncan 1986; Carlson, Mandell, & Williams,
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2004; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997). The standard executive function task is
characterized by the need to inhibit an interfering response inclination. Executive
inhibition is necessary when automatic inhibition and high activation of the desired action
schema fails (Pemer & Lang, 1999).
There are two general kinds of tasks to assess children’s inhibitory control and
task performance improves as a function of age with both assessments. A widely used
example of an executive function task is Luria’s hand game. In this task the participant is
instructed to do the opposite of what the experimenter does. The natural tendency to
imitate the experimenter interferes with the objective of the game (Luria, Pribram, &
Homskaya, 1964). A similar task is the Gift Delay Task where an experimenter instructs
the participants to not peek while the experimenter noisily wraps a present for them. This
kind o f task measures a child’s ability to suppress or delay an impulsive response
(Carlson & Moses, 2001). Another task used to measure inhibitory control requires that
children answer a certain way, even in the event of a highly salient and conflicting
response option. Cards with pictures o f either the sun or moon are presented to 3-to-7year-old children and the participants are instructed to say “night” in response to the sun
cards and “day” in response to the moon cards (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994).
Inhibitory control is the capacity to inhibit responses to irrelevant stimuli while
pursuing a cognitively represented goal and this has been thought to be a factor in the
developmental changes of a wide variety of cognitive abilities including intelligence,
attention, memory, emotion regulation and social competence (Carlson, & Moses, 2001).
Developments in inhibitory control mainly occur within the first six years of life, and this
notion has been supported by both behavioral and neuropsychological evidence. Research
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has identified the prefrontal cortex as a key component of inhibition and other aspects of
executive functioning. Brain maturation research indicates that the prefrontal cortex is a
slowly maturing brain area with the frontal lobes developing rapidly during infancy, a
period of developmental delay, and then another growth spurt between the ages of four
and seven (Carlson, & Moses, 2001; Luria, 1973). Behavioral and fMRI studies indicate
that executive control processes such as response inhibition are not fully developed until
adolescence (Luna & Sweeney, 2004).
These behavioral errors could be attributed not to dissociations in knowledge and
action but to the type of response required of the child. For example, infants demonstrate
much more knowledge of hidden objects when looking time is as used a dependent
measure instead o f reaching (Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, & Black, 1990). Diamond
(1985; 1988; 1990a; 1990b) completed a series of studies to explain this discrepancy and
believed that the error results from both the infants’ poor memories for the hiding place
and their inability to inhibit strong motor responses. The researcher concluded that the
delay aspect of the task was very important to decrease memory of the hiding event and
to decrease the ability to inhibit the prepotent response.
Another explanation for this inconsistency is that the infant simply makes a reach
to the wrong location. This means that the infant may be knowledgeable of the location of
the object but merely reaches to a different location. Previous studies have shown that
infants usually represent space egocentrically rather than based on the target object’s
position and infants who have been accustomed to reach to position A will continue to
reach for the same location (relative to their own bodies) even if the table has been turned
180 degrees and the two locations have now been switched (Bremner & Bryant, 1977).
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Slight variations in testing conditions will easily lead the infant to reach in the
correct position. Clues within the environment that to help distinguish between the two
targets (e.g. adding landmarks to the surrounding, making the hiding covers more
distinct, testing the infants in a more familiar location, etc) have been shown to decrease
the frequency of perseverative reaching (Acredolo, 1985; Wellman et al. 1986). There
have also been studies to show that even the infants’ level of experience in self
locomotion was strongly related to the frequency of correct reaches in the A-not-B task
(Bertenthal & Campos, 1990). It seems as though this “error” is a result of the infants’
response to a set of very specific parameters and the frequency of errors can be
manipulated accordingly.
To account for the variability of results within the various A-not-B error tasks,
Thelen, Schoner, Scheier, & Smith (2001) have presented a model to explain this
inconsistency in results. The dynamic systems approach to the A-not-B error looks at the
different motor, perceptual and cognitive processes contributing to the behavior as being
coupled interactions which are continuous and based in time. The researchers believe that
this model not only accounts for the search error but also how the perseverative
responding changes due to age or environment. They believe that this error evolves from
the same multiple processes that generate goal-directed reaching at any age.
Previous explanations have rooted the cause of the A-not-B error to infants’
deficits in object knowledge, spatial localization, memory, or inhibition (Marcovitch, &
Zelazo, 1999; Munakata, 1997; Wellman et al., 1986) but in the dynamic systems
approach the attention is focused on the reaching aspect of the error and the processes
that lead to a directional reach to the incorrect and correct target locations. The

researchers of this model believe that the relative ambiguity of the task is a very
important parameter in the model and the relative strength of the specific input is also an
essential component. In their explanation, the error emerges in the context of the specific
behavior or reaching and infants make perseverative location errors because the motor
memory of one reach persists and influences subsequent behaviors (Thelen et al., 2001).
Card Sorting Error
Another paradigm that has been used frequently to investigate the occurrence of
knowledge/action dissociations is the rule use paradigm (Luria, 1961; Zelazo & Reznick,
1991). In a rule task the children are given explicit instructions and must use the
instructions to guide their actions. Zelazo and Reznick (1991) found that 3-year-olds
were able to use a specific rule to guide their behavior (sorting all the triangle cards from
the circle cards into the appropriate trays) but Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai (1995) found age
related differences in the card sort task between the ages of 3- and 5-years of age when
the child was asked to switch to a new rule. The 3-year-olds would successfully sort the
cards based on the first rule (sort by color) but when asked to switch to a new rule (sort
by shape), they persisted in sorting the cards according to the first rule even when they
were repeatedly reminded of the new rule on every trial. Interestingly enough, the 4- or 5year-olds were able to switch to the new rules almost immediately (Frye, Zelazo, Palfai,
1995). Just like the A-not-B-error, the card sorting error posed the question of whether
the child is knowledgeable about the new rule and just cannot inhibit a motor response or
if there is an expression of cognitive immaturity within the 3-year-olds.
Zelazo, Frye & Rapus (1996) wanted to see if the children who were not able to
switch between rule pairs could identify the new rule. In this experiment the researchers
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gave 3- and 4-year-old children the dimensional change card sort as in the previous study,
and then had the children complete additional trials to assess the children’s understanding
of the post-switch rules. After the post-switch trials, the children were asked two
knowledge questions and one action question. For the knowledge questions the children
were asked what the rules of the game were and the children were asked to point to the
appropriate tray. For the action question the children were given another sorting trial
similar to the post-switch trials where the child had to place the card in the appropriate
tray according to the experimenter’s instruction.
The researchers found that regardless of which dimension (color or shape) was
presented to the children first, 3-year-olds were more likely than 4-year-olds to continue
using the first rules during the post-switch trials. The 3-year-olds (and a couple of the 4year olds who failed during the post-switch trials) demonstrated during the additional
trials that they understood the new rule (would point to the appropriate tray when
questioned about a rule) but continued to sort based on the pre-switch rule even during
the action question. This indicates that the 3-year-olds were cognitively aware of the new
rule but could not inhibit the overwhelming perseverative motor response.
To challenge the idea of perseverative responses the researchers wanted to also
examine whether this apparent dissociation between knowledge and action was due to a
failure to inhibit overly learned responses to the test cards. The idea that response
interference increases as a function of the number of pre-switch trials would support the
notion of perseverative behaviors. Therefore the researchers in a second experiment gave
the 3-year-olds one trial before a new rule was introduced. The results indicated that a
majority of the 3-year-olds perseverated even after only one pre-switch trial. The
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researchers concluded that although a possibility, it is very unlikely that a 3-year-olds’
ability to inhibit is so weak that one pre-switch trial could provide enough interference to
produce inhibitory failure and produce an inappropriate response. In a subsequent
experiment, the researchers also determined that 3-year-olds continued to perseverate
even when they were instructed to respond verbally to the task; this indicates that
response modality is not a factor and the children continue to have difficulty switching
rules even when they need to use verbal knowledge.
A more recent study involving the use of the card sorting task and the
investigation into the knowledge-action dissociation revealed different results that
challenged interpretations of previous study results. Munakata & Yerys (2001) believed
that the key to the apparent dissociation lies in the degree of conflict presented to the
child. They assert that the action measure has inherent conflict where the child must sort
a card with conflicting cues of color and shape into the appropriate tray, whereas the
knowledge measure does not provide a corresponding conflict (the children are simply
asked to repeat the rule). To assess this theory the researchers tested the role of conflict
in dissociations between knowledge and action in the card-sorting task.
The children were presented with the standard version of the task with nonconflict
and conflict knowledge questions. An example of a conflict knowledge question would
be, “Where do the red trucks go in the shape game?” The results indicated that
knowledge and action measures were the same when the child was presented with a
conflict knowledge question, demonstrating that the observed dissociations between
knowledge and action in the previous card sorting tasks could be associated with the
degree of object representation (Munakata & Yerys, 2001). The researchers theorize that
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dissociations between knowledge and action may reflect relatively weak representations
that are adequate for some types of tasks but not others. They believe that stronger
representations are needed when children face conflicting cues and this apparent
knowledge-action dissociation is not based on a child’s failure to use their knowledge
appropriately. Like the previous A-not-B-error studies, a simple change in the way the
task is presented to the child can reduce the instances of error and decrease the apparent
dissociation between knowledge and action.
Scale Errors
A more recently investigated developmental “error” that is the basis for the
present study is the scale error first described by DeLoache, Uttal, & Rosengren (2004).
The study concept originated from informal observations of young children attempting to
perform actions that were, due to the object’s size relative to the child, impossible.
Parents and experimenters, in the research lab or from home accounts, witnessed children
trying to get inside of small toy cars, putting doll shoes on their own feet, or trying to sit
in dollhouse chairs. These children seemed to make serious attempts at these behaviors
and the researchers believed that this was a failure or “error” by the children to use visual
information about size when interacting with the objects.
In order to investigate these strange occurrences, the researchers set up a study to
systematically examine the incidences of scale errors. The researchers recruited 54
children (29 girls, 25 boys) between 18 and 30 months of age (M = 22 months) to
participate in the study. The children were observed in a laboratory playroom with
various toys. There were three large target toys - an indoor slide, a child-size chair, and a
child-size toy car but the room also contained many other toys and the children were free
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to choose what toy to interact with. If the child did not spontaneously interact with the
target toys, the experimenter prompted the child to play with the three target toys at least
twice. The child was then lead out of the room and the three large target toys were
replaced with three identical miniature target toys. The child was then returned to the
room and allowed to play with the various toys again. If the child did not spontaneously
interact with the miniature replicas, the experimenter would once again prompt the child
to interact with them but did not comment on the size of the object.
Very conservative criteria were used in the identification of scale errors. All
children were videotaped and a primary coder identified a behavior as a scale error if the
following requirements were met: (1) the child attempted to perform part or all of the
same action with the miniature toy as with the larger toy, (2) the relevant part of the
child’s body for executing that behavior came into full contact with the relevant part of
the miniature toy, and (3) the child made a serious attempt to perform the action. One or
two additional coders then evaluated each potential scale error and 100% agreement was
required between the coders for the behavior to be identified as a scale error.
The distinction between serious attempt to perform an inappropriate action and
pretend play was carefully taken into account. All the videotapes were independently
coded to identify for instances of pretend play and scale errors were reliably
distinguished from pretend play where 58 pretend play episodes were identified.
Examples of pretend play included pushing the toy car around on the ground while
making car noises or sliding down the slide with their hand. The researchers pointed out
that there was no overlap between the behaviors coded as scale errors and those coded as
pretend play.
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The results o f this study indicated that scale errors were committed by 25 of the
54 children and the coders reliably identified 40 instances of scale errors. Fourteen of the
scale errors occurred without the experimenter drawing attention to the target object and
the results showed no relation between the amount of time spent with the larger target
object and the probability of committing a scale error with the miniature target object.
The number of errors did differ significantly by age with most of the scale errors
occurring with children around 2 years of age.
DeLoache and colleagues speculated many reasons for this apparent inability of
the toddlers to use visual information about the object’s size to guide their actions. The
researchers first set up an independent control study to rule out that the children simply
preferred to interact with the miniature object or that there is a general inability to make
appropriate size judgments. The researchers recruited 8 children between 19 and 28
months of age and presented them individually with pairs of large and small objects
simultaneously and asked the children to perform a target action. The various target
actions included: “Come and sit in the chair,” “Can you go down the side,” and “Drive
the car over here.” The results indicated that the children were able to distinguish
between the two objects and were able to choose the correct object to interact with when
prompted with a target action by the experimenter.
If children are capable of discriminating between the larger and smaller object and
are able to choose the appropriate object that corresponds with a target action when the
objects are presented together, then why do the children seem to fail at matching the
correct response to the corresponding object size? DeLoache and colleagues pointed out
that a special feature of these scale errors is that the children in fact do take into account
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the object’s size when interacting with the object. For example, when a child starts to
initiate a scale error with the miniature car, instead of making large scale motions as with
the larger toy car, the child bends down to get close to the miniature car and uses a
smaller grasping action to open the small door and directs their foot toward the small
door opening. The same general actions that were performed with the larger toy were
attempted with the smaller toy but it seems as though the children adjusted their
movements to the size of the smaller toy.
Similar to the various theories explaining the A-not-B error and the card sort
error, DeLoache and colleagues proposed that the scale errors involve a dissociation
when using visual information for planning vs. controlling of actions. They believe that
when a child sees a replica of a highly familiar object, the visual information from that
object activates the child’s representation for the larger object. This activated
representation also includes motor responses associated with the object and the child is
unable to inhibit the activated motor responses and therefore commits a scale error. To
account for the children’s adjusted movements to the size of the smaller object, the
researchers believe that it is after the action plan is initiated that the child uses the visual
information about the object size to calibrate movements and motions directed at the
object.
Just like the previous two developmental errors, there seems to be an emphasis on
the failure of inhibitory control. DeLoache and colleagues recognize that infants and
children have difficulty inhibiting prepotent responses but they do not believe that
difficulty with inhibitory control can fully explain scale errors. The researchers also
suggest that the dissociation between the use of visual information for planning versus
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control could substantiate dual process theories of visual processing. There are many
theories of visual processing but one of the most cited, and acknowledged by DeLoache
and colleagues, is the two visual system hypothesis (Goodale & Milner, 1992;
Underleider & Mishkin, 1982; Schneider, 1967). This theory speculates the existence of
two neurally and functionally distinct visual systems for action and perception. The
dorsal visual stream would mediate the control of visually guided actions whereas the
ventral stream facilitates perceptual and cognitive representations of objects. Evidence
for the existence of two visual systems has been supported by studies looking at apparent
dissociations in action and perception expressed by brain-damaged individuals and
normal responses to visual illusions (Glover, 2004; Goodale & Milner, 1992).
The two visual system hypothesis (TVSH) is supported, in part, by the finding
that grip formation during grasping is largely immune to the influence o f many pictorial
illusions (e.g., Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995). Such results suggest that one visual
stream controls illusion-susceptible perceptual judgments, while a separate stream
controls illusion-resistant visually-guided actions (Glover, 2004; Milner & Goodale,
1995). Much of the evidence for the dissociation of the two visual pathways comes from
studies with brain damaged patients who were either suffering form lesions in the
posterior parietal lobe or the inferior temporal lobe. Patients with lesions in the posterior
parietal lobe were impaired in visuomotor coordination while patients with inferior
temporal lobe damage had trouble recognizing objects (Goodale & Milner, 1992).
Different variations of the judgment and reaching tasks using a commonly known
visual illusion called the Ebbinghaus illusion have produced inconsistent results, leading
many researchers to dispute conclusions regarding the two visual system hypothesis
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(Franz, 2001; Glover, 2004; Smeets, Brenner, de Grave, & Cuijpers, 2002; Vishton &
Fabre, 2003; Vishton, Rea, Cutting, & Nunez, 1998). This hypothesis implies the
presence of two relatively independent, parallel processing streams but recent results by
Vishton, Stephens, Nelson, Morra, Brunick, and Stevens (2007) have suggested,
however, that as a participant prepares to reach for a target, all visually-mediated
responses become less sensitive to the illusion. There is evidence for different visual
processing for reaching and non-reaching tasks, but the changes seem to happen on a
system-wide basis, influencing all visually guided tasks to the same degree. Based on
recent evidence it could be contended that the human visual system possesses two
separate modes of processing, one for non-action, verbal responses, and another for
visually-guided actions (Brito, Brunick, & Vishton, in prep; Vishton et al., 2007)
DeLoache and colleagues believe that scale errors imply an immaturity in the
interaction of the two visual streams of processing which is exhibited by the intermittent
failure to integrate the visual information processed by the two systems. In their
description of a scale error, the information about the identity of an object, processed by
the ventral stream, is not integrated with information about the object’s size, which is
processed by the dorsal system. In a review article, Scott Glover (2004) indicated that the
scale error research, “offers a unique example of how stored representations of object
affordances combined with semantic category knowledge, can overpower immediate
visual information in the undeveloped mind” (p. 442). Glover stated that the scale error
explanation proposed by DeLoache and colleagues assumes that children (1) have a
stored concept of the toy’s actual size in the real world, (2) are able to judge the actual
size of the toy (demonstrated by the child’s calibrated movements toward the object), and
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(3) experience an interference between the stored concept of the object and the toy itself
when an action plan is prepared (Glover, 2004).
Another model presented to explain the occurrence of scale errors presented by
DeLoache and colleagues (2004) and highly supported by Glover (2004) is the planningcontrol model. This model supports the idea that the planning portion of a behavior is
influenced by numerous cognitive variables including semantics, visual illusions, and
memories of past actions. Stored semantic knowledge for a target object evokes a specific
response but once the movement is initiated, the on-line control system (which is
uninfluenced by semantic knowledge) ensures correct movement based on the toy’s
actual size (Glover, 2004; Glover, 2002; Glover & Dixon, 2001). The planning-control
model argues that action planning involves a medial visual stream terminating in the
inferior parietal lobes before a response is initiated (Boussaoud, Ungerleider, &
Desimone, 1990). The hypothesized key difference between the planning-control model
and the action-perception model is that the planning-control model predicts that the early
portion of the child’s movement toward the object would be influenced by the stored
object representation, movements are then adjusted in flight to the actual size of the toy,
whereas the action-perception model predicts that movements toward the object are
appropriately scaled from the beginning and there is no interference between stored
knowledge and behavior towards the object (Glover, 2004).
Thesis Overview
The planning-control model and the action-perception model attempt to explain
the unique intricacies o f this developmental error but like the A-not-B error and card sort
error, the definite cause(s) is still unclear. Could the occurrence of scale errors be
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generally due to the perseveration of automatic responses or are children misperceiving
the target object? In the following set of experiments we attempt to distinguish what cues
or object characteristics will increase or decrease the chance of these scale errors. Studies
have demonstrated that children will reach for objects with one- or two-handed grips that
are matched to the size of the reaching target. Infants usually begin reaching around 4
months of age and at that time their reaching efforts are poorly controlled and are often
performed with two hands regardless o f the objects’ size (Thelen, Corbetta, Kamm,
Spencer, Schneider, & Zemicke, 1993; von Hofsten, 1979) and by 8 months of age,
infants can preshape their handgrip configuration to adapt to the object’s shape and
orientation (von Hofsten & Fazel-Zandy, 1984).
We have replaced the three target toys from the original scale error research with
identical objects (cylinders or rectangles) of varying size (See Figure 1) and have
associated the occurrence of a scale error to the frequency with which a two-handed grip
is selected for objects of different sizes. That is, a scale error (performing an
inappropriate action based on the object’s size) is similar to a child using an inappropriate
handgrip (one- versus two-handed reach) based on the object’s size. We have examined
the role motor priming or perseverative reaching plays on the frequency of two-handed
reaches and what cues (size versus shape) are more salient for the child in determining
appropriate handgrip.
The last experiment looks to try to understand the child’s comprehension o f the
changing state of the object by convincing the child that one object is being transformed
into varying sizes or that several independent objects (all fully visible) are presented to
the child. Another key distinction between this study and the original scale error research
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is that a much wider age range of participants has been recruited for the various
experiments. Although DeLoache and colleagues found results that scale errors are
committed more frequently around 2 years of age, we believe that children of all ages
(and possibly even adults) can commit these errors given the precise cues and situation.
The following experiments look at the various factors necessary for an individual to
commit a scale error and how manipulating those factors can influence an individual’s
behavioral response.
EXPERIMENT 1: FREQUENCY OF TWO-HANDED REACHES AS A FUNCTION
OF OBJECT SIZE
The first experiment examined how experience reaching for an object of a
particular size and shape influences later reaches for other objects. Specifically, we
assessed the frequency of one-versus -two-hand reaches. The experimenter presented the
participants with a series of objects that were identical in shape, but varied in size, and
encouraged them to reach out and lift them. We predicted that familiarization with a
particular size would impact how participants will reach for other objects that may differ
in size but not shape. For example, if a child successfully has reached for the first object
using a one-handed grip, he or she will tend to reach for all objects with that shape using
a one-handed grip, even if the type of grip is inappropriate. To explore if the effect was
only due to some characteristic of the particular stimuli, some participants were presented
with rectangular blocks instead of cylinders. These rectangular blocks were constructed
to match the height and width of the cylinder stimuli.
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Method
Participants. We recruited forty children (21 males, 19 females) ages 2-to-5
years o f age (M^ 34.00 months, SD= 13.00 months) from the surrounding community for
the cylinder condition and six children (3 males, 3 females) ages 1-to-4 years of age (M=
27.47 moths, SD= 11.79 months) were recruited for the rectangle condition. There were
five age categories with six children in the 1-year-old group, eighteen children in the 2year-old group, nine children in the 3-year-old group, ten children in the 4-year-old group
and two children in the 5-and-older group. We obtained parental informed consent at the
start of the procedure and at the end of the study we offered the children a small toy or
sticker for their participation.
Displays and Apparatus. Participants sat in a chair (45 cm tall) in front of a table
surface (73 cm tall X 152 cm wide x 76 cm in depth). All the participants were presented
with seven identical cylinders (identical in shape, color, and texture) of varying size. The
ratio o f width to height was always 1.35 cm. The seven widths were: (1) 2.7 cm, (2) 3.3
cm (3) 4.0 cm, (4) 5.8 cm, (5) 6.9 cm, (6) 10.1 cm, and (7) 12.7 cm in diameter. The
largest object was too large for most children to grasp easily with one hand. We presented
the target cylinders to the children on a thin rectangular wooden board (45.5 cm tall x 61
cm wide x 5 mm thick).
Design. Participants completed 22 reaching trials. All participants began with five
trials with the smallest cylinder, then each of the other cylinders in order of size up to the
largest cylinder. The experimenter then presented the participant with five trials of the
largest cylinder, then each of the other cylinders in order of size down to the smallest
cylinder (or in reverse with the largest cylinder primed first). We randomly assigned each
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participant, without replacement, to one of two size conditions (smallest cylinder primed
first vs. largest cylinder primed first).
Procedure. The participants sat in the chair or in the caregiver’s lap. The height of
the chair was adjusted so that the participants could easily reach for the objects. If the
participant was seated in the caregiver’s lap, the caregiver was instructed to not interfere
with the study procedure. The experimenter began the procedure by placing an occluding
panel in position in front of the participant to obscure her view while the experimenter
placed the first target object onto the middle of the presentation board. The start of the
trial was indicated when the occluding panel was removed. The presentation board then
was pushed toward the participant until the target object was within reach. The
participant was then asked to reach and pick up the target object. The experimenter
retrieved the object and the process was repeated for the other various sizes. The end of
the trial was marked by the removal of the presentation board by the experimenter. If the
participant lost interest or became agitated before all the trials were completed, the
session was terminated. All trials were videotaped to record a side-view of the
participant’s reaching behavior and the entire procedure lasted approximately 25 minutes.
Data Scoring and Analysis. The trials were coded from the videotapes by an
independent observer using the Noldus Observer XT 7.0 (Wageningen, The Netherlands)
program. The videotapes were coded for the observation of one vs. two handed reaches
toward the object and whether the participant was successfully able to pick up the object.
The start of a trial was coded with the forward movement of the presentation board and
each hand was scored separately. A right and left hand reach within one second of each
other within the same trial was coded as a two-handed reach.
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We examined the frequency with which a two-handed grip is selected for objects
of different sizes. A Repeated-Measures ANOVA was used with object size, prime
direction (whether the objects were presented from smallest to largest or largest to
smallest), and age category as the independent variables and percentage of two-handed
reaches as the dependent variable.
Results and Discussion
The frequency of two-handed reaches was found to be a function of the object
size. The size of the initial object prime did influence the type of reach performed for
successive reaches. We did not find a significant difference for object shape (cylinders
versus rectangles), F(l,34) = 0.001,/? = .981, so for subsequent analyses we collapsed the
data across these conditions. We found significant main effects for prime direction,
F(l,30) = 9.100,/? = 0.005, r|p2= .233 and object size, F(4,120) = 13.394, p < .005, rjp2 =
.309. Figures 1 shows a significant interaction for prime direction and object size,
F(4,120) = 5.933,/? < .005, ilP2= .165 for both the cylinder and rectangle condition. We
did not find any significant differences between the age categories, F(l,30) = 0.627,/? =
0.647. When children were primed with the smallest object and then presented with test
objects varying in size up to the largest object, there was a strong tendency to reach with
one hand (or vice versa for the large prime). These results would indicate that there is
strong tendency to use the same type of reach after being primed with a specific sized
target and these results were not due to a unique characteristic (specific shape) of the
target object.
EXPERIMENT 2: FREQUENCY OF TWO-HANDED REACHES AS A FUNCTION
OF OBJECT SIZE AND OBJECT SHAPE
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The second experiment examined how object size and shape familiarity
influenced the frequency of one or two-handed reaches when the participant is primed
with a particular size and a particular shape. We predicted that familiarization with a
particular size and shape would impact how participants would reach for other objects
and that the frequency of one or two handed reaches would be more consistent if the
shape did not change. We also predicted that changing the shape of the object would
influence the participant’s grip selection more than the size of the object.
Method
Participants. We recruited 102 children (52 males, 50 females) ages l-to-4 years
of age (M= 25.98 months, SD= 12.74 months) from the surrounding community. There
were five age categories with forty children in the 1-year-old group, twenty-five children
in the 2-year-old group, twenty-one children in the 3-year-old group, and sixteen children
in the 4-year-old group. We obtained parental informed consent at the start of the
procedure and at the end of the study we offered the children a small toy or sticker for
their participation.
Procedure. The materials, study design, procedure, and analysis were identical to
those described in Experiment 1 except as noted here. The participants completed 28
trials and were only presented with the smallest (1), largest (7), and middle-sized (5)
objects. The ratio of width to height was always 1.35 cm and the three widths were: (1)
2.7 cm, (5) 6.9 cm, and (7) 12.7 cm in diameter. The experimenter presented the
participant with five trials of the smallest object, then one trial of the middle-size and
largest object each. The presentation of objects was repeated, and then the order was
reversed with five trials of the largest object and one trial of the middle-size and smallest
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object (or vice-versa with the participant starting with the largest prime). The shape of the
two test objects either remained the same after the prime object or changed shape.
We examined the frequency with which a two-handed grip is selected for objects
of different sizes. A Repeated-Measures ANOVA was used to assess how the frequency
of two-handed reaches varied as a function of age, initial prime size, and object shape.
Results and Discussion
Across all five age categories we found a significant main effect for the initial
prime size, F(l,85) = 29.045,/? < .005, r|p2= .255 and a significant interaction for initial
prime size and object shape, F(l,85) = 7.048,/? < .005, r|p2= .077 (Figure 2). We did not
find a significant main effect for object shape across all six age categories, F(l,85) =
2.882,/? = .093 (Figure 3). These results indicated that like the previous experiment, the
initial prime size is an influential factor in the frequency of two-handed reaches. An
interesting finding in this experiment is the tendency to stay with the same reach type for
objects with the same shape but not for objects with a different shape. When a child is
primed with a particular sized object she is more likely to continue with that reach type
(one versus two-handed reach) for objects with the same shape and will change reach
type when a different shaped object is presented.
Further analyses revealed a significant main effect for shape, F(1,91) = 8.813,/? =
0.004, V = -88>across all age categories for the smallest object prime but not for the
largest object prime. We found no significant differences for object shape within each age
category individually but when consecutive age groups were examined we did find
significant differences: (1) One-year-olds & Two-year-olds F(l,57) = 5.980,/? = .018, rjp2
= .095, (2) Two-year-olds & Three-year-olds F(l,38) = 7.517,/? = .009, r|p2 = .165, and
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(3) Three-year-olds & Four-year-olds F(l,32) = 7.891,/? = .008, r|p2 = .198. The results
demonstrated differences between adjoining age groups for object shape but there is no
definite trend or peak frequency, which made it difficult to assess any developmental
differences. The relationship between object shape and small prime size could be due to
the small hand size of the children and this will be determined in future analyses.
The first two experiments look at how the object characteristics can influence the
occurrence of one or two-handed reaches. Experiment 2 indicates the presence of shapespecific action perseveration and the following experiment explored whether it is simply
shape-specific perseveration or individual object-specific perseveration that produced the
observed trend.
EXPERIMENT 3: FREQUENCY OF TWO-HANDED REACHES AS A FUNCTION
OF THE NUMBER OF OBJECTS VISIBLE
The third experiment explored the idea of scale errors further by examining the
child’s knowledge of the object. In the previous experiments and in the original scale
error research, the children were presented with various objects of different sizes to
interact with, but how the child conceptualized the changing size of the object is
unknown.
In this experiment, we attempted to bridge from the occurrence of scale errors
(frequency of one vs. two-handed reaches and inappropriate grip type) to the child’s
understanding of the changing state of the object. We presented the children with one of
two extremes: (1) a “transformation machine” that seems to transform the same object
from one size to another and (2) visual access to all three objects while performing the
trial. That is, in the transformation condition, participants were led to believe that only
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one object was used throughout the experiment. In the visual access condition, it was
made clear that a collection of three objects was used. We predicted a higher occurrence
of scale errors if the child believed that the object was the same, and we predicted that
this would produce inappropriate grip types even if there were drastic changes in size.
Method
Participants. We recruited 146 children (73 males, 73 females) ages 2-to-6 years
of age (M= 54.59 months, SD= 9.97 months) from the surrounding community. There
were four age categories with thirteen children in the 3-year-old group, fifty children in
the 4-year-old group, sixty-seven children in the 5-year-old group, and sixteen children in
the 6-and-older group. We obtained parental informed consent at the start of the
procedure and at the end of the study we offered the children a small toy or sticker for
their participation.
Displays and Apparatus. Participants sat in a chair (45 cm tall) in front of a table
surface (73 cm tall X 152 cm wide x 76 cm in depth). The participants were only
presented with the smallest (1), largest (7), and middle-sized (5) cylinders. The largest
object was too large for most children to grasp easily with one hand. The target cylinders
were presented to the children on a rectangular board (27.0 cm long x 21.5 cm wide x 1
cm thick). A smaller board was used in this experiment to fit underneath of the
transformation machine. The transformation machine consisted of 5 air condition vents
assembled together around a wooden frame (53.5 cm long x 38.5 cm wide x 38.5 cm tall).
The bottom of the crate was open in order for the machine to be placed over the target
objects and there was a trap door on the back of the machine to covertly change the
objects without the participant’s knowledge. The transformation machine made futuristic
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mechanical noises and flashed a bright light when engaged with a switch on the front
exterior. Two identical toy trains (big - 6.1 cm long x 3.2 cm wide x 4.2 cm tall and small
-13 cm long x 5.5 cm wide x 7.6 cm tall) were used to demonstrate how the machine
worked and the transformation machine was only used in the transformation condition.
Design. Participants completed 21 reaching trials. All participants began with five
trials with the smallest or largest cylinder, then each of the other cylinders in order of
size. The process was then repeated twice more. We randomly assigned each participant,
without replacement, to one of two size conditions (small prime vs. large prime) and to
one of two experiment conditions (transformation vs. fully visible).
Procedure. The participants sat in the chair or in the caregiver’s lap. The height of
the chair was adjusted so that the participants could easily reach for the objects. If the
participant was seated in the caregiver’s lap, the caregiver was instructed to not interfere
with the study procedure.
In the transformation condition the experimenter began the experiment by
familiarizing the child with the transformation machine. All exterior sides of the machine
were shown to the child and the capability of the machine was also explained. The
researcher explained to the participant that the machine could make objects bigger or
smaller (the red button on the machine made objects smaller and the blue button on the
machine made objects bigger).
The researcher first performed a demonstration before the test trials. The
experimenter placed an occluding panel in position in front of the participant to obscure
their view while the experimenter placed the bigger toy train onto the middle of the
presentation board. The occluding panel was removed and the experimenter stated to the
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child that the machine was going to make the toy smaller. The transformation box was
put over the train and the participant was instructed by a second experimenter to push the
red button and turn on the switch to start the machine. While the participant was
preoccupied with the lights and sounds, the first experimenter switched the bigger toy
train for the smaller toy train through the trap door. When notified by the first
experimenter, the second experimenter instructed the participant to turn off the machine.
The transformation machine was lifted aside and the smaller toy train was revealed to the
participant. The process was then repeated going from the smaller toy train to the bigger
toy train (the participant this time was instructed to push the blue button in order to make
the toy bigger again).
After the demonstration period ended the test trials began. The start of the trial
was indicated when the occluding panel was removed and the presentation board was
pushed toward the participant until the target object was within reach. The participant
was then asked to reach and pick up the target object. The experimenter held the
occluding panel to the side until the participant picked up the target object, after which
the process was repeated for the other various sizes. The end of the trial was marked by
the removal of the presentation board by the experimenter. The key point in the
transformation condition is that anytime the target object changed size (big to small or
small to big), the transformation machine was used to convince the child that the same
object was being manipulated and presented.
In the fully visible condition, the procedure is identical to those described in the
transformation condition except as noted here. The transformation machine is never used
and there was no demonstration with the toy trains. All three cylinders were in plain view
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on the table, but not within reaching distance, o f the participant the at all times and were
only hidden from the participant’s view by the occluding panel when a new object was
being placed on the presentation board (in order to reduce experimenter influence of one
or two handed grip selection of the object). To rule out the possibility of a delay effect in
the transformation condition, in the fully visible condition the experimenter waited five to
seven seconds (the same amount of time as the transformation condition) before
presenting a different sized target object to the participant. The key point in the fully
visible condition is that all three cylinders are in view when the participant is reaching for
the target object, in an effort to make the size changes more apparent.
If the participant lost interest or became agitated before all the trials were
completed, the session was terminated. All trials were videotaped to record a side-view of
the participant’s reaching behavior and the entire procedure lasted approximately 25
minutes.
Data Scoring and Analysis. The trials were coded from the videotapes by an
independent observer using the Noldus Observer XT 7.0 (Wageningen, The Netherlands)
program. The videotapes were coded for the observation of one vs. two handed reaches
toward the object and whether the participant was successfully able to pick up the object.
The start of a trial was coded with the forward movement of the presentation board and
each hand was scored separately. A right and left hand reach within one second of each
other within the same trial was coded as a two-handed reach.
We examined the frequency with which a two-handed grip is selected for objects
o f different sizes. A 2x2 ANOVA was used to assess how the frequency of two-handed
reaches varied as a function of initial prime size and experiment condition.
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Results and Discussion
The frequency of two-handed reaches was a function of the object size and
influenced by both the experimental condition and the initial object prime. We performed
an ANOVA with condition and initial prime size as the independent factors and the
percentage of two-handed reaches as the single dependent variable. Significantly more
two-handed reaching was found in the fully visible (M=0.545, SE=0.038) than in the
transformation condition (M=0.381, SD=0.039), F(l,142) = 9.816,/? = .003, r|p2= .057
(Figure 4). This main effect was unexpected, but not central to the question at hand. At
issue is the influence of target size increase and decrease on this measure.
We also found a significant difference between the initial prime size F (l, 142) =
55.908,/? < .005, r|p2= .289. Children across all four age categories were significantly
more likely to reach for the target object with two-hands in the fully visible condition and
were more likely to reach with two-hands if they were primed with the larger cylinder
first. Figure 5 shows a significant interaction between experimental condition and initial
prime size F(l,142) = 32.397,/? < .005, r|p2 = .181 indicating that children in the fully
visible condition were more likely than children in the transformation condition to
continue with the same type o f reach as the reach used during the initial prime.
Preliminary analyses indicated that there were no significant differences between
the four age categories for the frequency o f two-handed reaches but individual analyses
were performed on each category to determine any developmental trends. We found
significance for initial prime size in each of the four age categories: (1) Three-year-olds
F(l,8) = 11.191,/? = 0.010, rjp2= .583, (2) Four-year-olds F(l,48) = 21.628,/? < .005, r|p2
= .311, (3) Five-year-olds F(l,65) = 18.015,/? < .005, r\p2 = .217, and (4) Six-year-olds
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F(l,9) = 6.997, p = 0.027, r|p2 = .437. We did not find a significant main effect for
condition or an interaction effect for the three-year-olds and the six-year-olds but did find
a significant interaction of condition and initial prime size for the four-year-olds, F(l,48)
= 7.867, p = 0.007, T|p2 = .141. The five-year-old age group was the only age category to
have significant values for the experiment condition, F(l,65) = 9.002,p = 0.004, rjp2.122, and the interaction, F(l,65) = 17.219,p < .005, r|p2= .209, as well as the initial
prime size. These results suggest that the effects of condition and initial prime size are
the most influential within the five-year-old category but it should be noted that the fiveyear-old category also had the highest number of participants and the age differences
could be attributed to sample size differences. Further trials to even the sample sizes need
to be performed before any conclusive developmental trends can be assessed.
General Discussion
The demonstration of scale errors in the original research by DeLoache and
colleagues is a unique observation of the intricacies of the cognitive, perceptual, and
motor systems. It has been shown that from the age of three, children are capable of
perceiving what objects afford action for themselves or others (Rochat, 1995) but clearly
the scale error studies exhibit failure to either demonstrate this knowledge or inhibit a
strong motor tendency. In our current set of studies we have tried to systematically tease
apart the distinctive characteristics that make up this developmental error. Like both the
A-not-B-error task and the card sort task, the incidences of scale errors can be influenced
by slight changes in task ambiguity or difficulty, which could suggest that the cause of
scale errors can be explained better by motor priming or perseverative behavior accounts.
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In the first experiment we looked at the frequency of two-handed reaches as a
function of the object size. To reach accurately toward an object involves encoding its
location and grasping an object requires coding of the intrinsic features of the object such
as its size, shape, and orientation (Arbib, 1985; Jeannerod, 1988). Newell, Scully,
McDonald, and Baillargeon (1989) demonstrated a systematic relationship between the
size of the object and the number of fingers used in the grip for infants as young as four
months of age. We found a definite relationship between object size and the number of
hands used to pick up the object and there was a strong motor priming tendency where
children were inclined to stay with the same reach type after the priming trials. The
results also indicated that this relationship was not particular to a specific object shape.
We did not find any significant age differences between groups for the frequency of twohanded reaches, which could indicate that the error of using an inappropriate reach type
could be demonstrated across all ages (even with adults) if a particular situation is
presented.
The second experiment looked at the frequency of two-handed reaches as a
function of both size and shape of the object. Studies have indicated that infants can
process feature information and use this information to individuate objects (Wilcox &
Baillargeon, 1998; Wilcox & Schweinle, 2002). Wilcox (1999) demonstrated that infants
could use characteristics of shape at seven months, texture at eleven months, and color at
twelve months of age to distinguish objects. We found the same relationship between
object size and two-handed reaches, but our results also indicated that the tendency to
continue reaching with the same reach type decreases when presented with a different
shaped object.

32
The ability to discriminate objects based on properties/characteristics has been
demonstrated in many studies. Bushnell and Boudreau (1993) found that some properties
such as size and temperature demand minimal control of the hand and fingers, whereas
other properties such as weight and shape require much greater control and attention. The
researchers also reviewed ages at which infants first discriminate different object
properties and concluded that the sequence corresponds to developmental changes in the
control of the hand and fingers. Needham and Baillargeon (1995) found that infants by
the age of eight months can use object properties, such as color and shape, to help them
interpret ambiguous arrangements of objects and this ability was shown for four and five
month old infants when infants were given prior experience with the objects.
Our results indicate that the object property of shape is salient enough to decrease
the perseverative behavior across all ages. Cook and Odom (1992) found that 5-year-olds,
11-year-olds and adults all avoided classifications based on overall similarity of objects
and instead paid attention to single dimensions. Many classification studies have shown
that some dimensions are more salient to individuals than others (Odom & Cook, 1984;
Thompson & Massaro, 1989). Perhaps the greater control needed to grasp for different
shaped objects (or change of grip formation) and the higher salience for the property of
shape lead to the disruption of the motor priming in this task. We are currently
conducting a study on the relationship between two-handed reaches as a function of
object size, object shape, and object color to assess what properties decrease
perseverative behavior and to what extent.
The last experiment examined reaching responses based on the number o f known
or visible objects. In the fully visible condition all the objects, and the apparent size
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differences between the three objects, were visible to the participant. The perseverative
reaching behavior still occurred across all age groups and this result supports the motor
priming explanation. The children had access to size difference information but could not
make appropriate reaches after being primed with the small or large prime. Prior studies
have found that infants who reach immediately after the cue (no time delay) in the A-notB-error task were less likely to perseverate and more likely to make the correct choice
(Wellman, et al., 1986). In the fully visible condition, after the priming the children were
exposed to a delay before being presented with the target object and the frequency of
two-handed reaches was still related to the initial prime object size.
In the transformation condition we wanted the child to believe that the same
object was being presented each time but in varying sizes. This concept originated from a
study conducted by DeLoache, Miller, and Rosengren (1997) where the researchers
compared the performance of 2

Vz-

year-olds in symbolic and nonsymbolic versions of a

search task. The children in the symbolic condition had to watch the experimenter hide a
toy in the larger room and then find the toy in a scale model of the room, which was
located in an adjoining room. The children in the nonsymbolic condition were told that a
shrinking machine could make the room (and all the components of the room) larger or
smaller. The children in the nonsymbolic condition first watched the experimenter hide
the toy in the larger room, and then were escorted out of the room while the shrinking
machine transformed the room. The children returned to the room to find the scale model
and were instructed to find the toy. The children in the nonsymbolic search task were
much more successful retrieving the toy than the children in the symbolic condition. The
researchers reasoned that 2

Vz

- year-olds have difficulty representing symbolic relations
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and therefore the children in the symbolic condition were not able to use the scale model
as a symbol for the larger room.
In the original scale error research and in the first two experiments presented, the
number of objects presented to the child is not explicit. In the transformation condition
we wanted the child to believe that the same object was being presented with the
reasoning that if the child thinks it’s the same object, then they would be more inclined to
use the previous reach style. One possibility is that the transformation condition
heightened their attention and therefore made the children more aware o f the size
differences. Diamond (1998) found that infants made significantly fewer A-not-B-errors
when the toy was different from the toy used on previous trials and when the infants’
interest in that toy was high. In the same study, all infants reached correctly, even with a
delay, if the researcher substituted pieces of cookie for the hidden toys in the task.
Another explanation for the decrease in perseverative reaching could be attributed
to the verbal cues in the transformation condition. The children could have associated the
appropriate reach with the words “bigger” and “smaller” used by the experimenter. In a
future study we would like to perform the transformation condition without the verbal
cues and analyze the frequency change of reach type. If more errors occur we can
attribute our results to the verbal cues, and no change in errors or fewer errors would
support the attention explanation. In future studies we would also like to increase our
sample size, especially for the younger age groups, to not only assess developmental
trends but to also look for similarities and differences between our set of studies and the
original scale error research.
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A key difference between our studies and the original scale error research is the
idea of object representation. We viewed the original scale errors as a visuomotor
phenomenon where the child identified the object’s shape, color and texture but ignored
the size of the object when producing a behavioral response. An alternative explanation is
that this is a cognitive phenomenon and this alternative would predict that the child
identified the object’s name or purpose and this representation influenced the occurrence
of the errors. The target objects used in the original scale error research were all highly
familiar objects and it could be assumed that many of the children had various levels of
experience with these objects. The target objects in our research were not as familiar to
the children and the low level of experience could be a factor in the rate of perseveration.
In a future study we would like to explore the idea of scale errors as a cognitive
phenomenon and present children with the target objects but label the objects to make the
object’s identity more salient to the child.
As Thelen, Schoner, Scheier, and Smith (2001) suggest, information is not as
simple as the traditional input-transduction-output stream, and because perception, action,
decision, execution, and memory all work together, information is often time-based and
responses reflect patterns of cooperative and competitive interactions. The failure or error
in the A-not-B, card sort, and scale error tasks all come from the same multiple processes
that produce goal-directed reaching at any age. The experiments in this thesis aimed to
further add to the existing literature to fully understand what features or characteristics
infants/children look at to help them understand how to interact with objects and the
developing relationship between the perception and motor systems.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Study Stimuli.
Figure 2. Percentage of two-handed reaches as a function of prime direction and object
size across all ages for both cylinder and rectangular objects.
Figure 3. Percentage of two-handed reaches as a function of initial prime size and object
shape.
Figure 4. Percentage of two-handed reaches as a function of object shape across all ages
when primed with the smallest object.
Figure 5. Percentage of two-handed reaches for both transformation and fully visible
conditions across all ages.
Figure 6. Percentage of two-handed reaches for experimental condition and initial prime
size across all ages.
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